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IN THE LIGHT OF 
THIS US·IRAN HOSTILITY, 
THE WORSENING OF US· 
PAKISTAN RELATIONS, AN 
IRAN·PAKISTAN RAp· 
PROCHEMENT, AND THE 
INDO·PAKISTAN RIVALRY, 
THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT 
THE MATRIX OF INTER· 
ESTS OF MAJOR REGION· 
AL AND NON·REGIONAL 
PLAYERS IS QUITE COM· 
PLEX, CONTRADICTORY 
AND WILL REMAIN HARM· 
FUL TO AFGHANISTAN'S 
DEVELOPMENT 
• • • • 
Bonn's second Afghanistan conference in perspective - A comment 
'Nothing is straight · 
forward in 
Afghanistan', for this 
rcmaJtablc finding of Gcnmm 
Foreign Minister Dr. Guido 
Westcrwelle in his Jl olicy 
statement 10 the Ge rman 
Parliament 0 11 th e ISlh 
[}ecember 20 11. the interna -
tional community needed 10 
years, billions of doUars and COS! 
thous.1.nds of human lives. After 
Ilonn I in 2001, which waSalXlU! 
dreams of 5CCurity and freedom, 
one decade later Bonn 1I had to 
deal with realities on the ground, 
limiting the damage of another 
mili!a!), adwnturo oflhe US and 
ils allies. 
On December Slh 2011, 
around 1U00 delegaTes from 
!IIore than 80 countries and 15 
international organi~a· 
lions/regimes discllssed the 
b.~ic framework for a new ph;lSe 
of Ihe intemmional Cllgngemcm 
in Afghanistan. But the overall 
aim of the conference was not 
to set concrete parameters for 
the country's future, it was more 
about finding a good story-line 
for the West to get out of 
Afghanistan as soon and as 
cheap as possible v.1thout losing 
face. Therefore, tremendous 
cfforts were made to lUldcrlinc 
the achicvements of the las t 
decade as well as to give the 
imprcssionthat withdrawing 
comb.1t troop'S would be leaving 
behind an almost stable country 
and an international 
comnlunity which would never 
forget Afghanistan again. 
Being aware of this staged 
spectacle. a remarkably self-
confident Afghan delegation 
aimed at extracting as many 
commitments as possible from 
the international community 
and in return offering almost 
nothing participated in the 
conference. However, thc official 
purposc of tile conference was 
10 broadcn the basis of cooper-
alion between t he intemat ional 
conununity and Afghanistan as 
well as to convince the Afghan 
governmen t and people that 
they could trust Ihe interna · 
tional commlmity and that they 
will receive support beyond 
2014. 
In this light. Bonn II was 
envisaged to cover particularly 
the following three a reas: 
II,mdingover responsibility for 
sccurityfrom the International 
Securily i\>;sistance Force (lW) 
to the Afghan National Security 
r1Jrces (ANSF).long-terrn inler-
natiormj ellgagcrnclll including 
financial support and training 
for Afghan security forces, 
building-up of ndm iniSlrarion, 
economic development. (IIld the 
continuation of the peace and 
n3!ional reconciliation process. 
Due toV'<lrious reasons, il is nOI 
surprising that regarding each 
of Ihese issues - beside vague 
'mu tual commitments ' - the 
confcrence did not produce any 
significant Olllcon1('S. TIlere is a 
common \1!ldeI'51anding among 
Ihe ISAF stntes thnl instead of 
deploying some tens of 
thousands of comb.1t troops . it's 
time that the Afghans by 
themselves should fight the 
Taliban and other Opposing 
Militant Forces (OMP). This 
process. which is called ~ period 
ofmU1sition. Vlili be finalized by 
the end of 20J4. There is no 
doubt thnt the Afghan 
government has to gain full 
sovereignty and authority as 
soon as possible. But given thc 
difficulties which the ANSF 
currently hns had 10 fnce nfter 
security responsibilities were 
hnnded over in almost 30% 10 
4{)')1', of the territory. one might 
raise the legitimate qucstion if 
the Afghan govemment v.ill be 
able to maintain the monopoly 
over the use of force. e nsure 
stability as weU as protect the 
political system and its instilU-
tions. !n other words. it is 
obvious that the decision to 
withdraw the international 
troops from Afghmlistan was not 
based on a positive assessme nt 
of the securi ty si tunlion, 
mcaning that lSAI' fu.lftlJcd its 
mission and is leaving a stable 
and SCCllre Afghanistan behine!. 
!n contrnst . the lSAF was n01 
nble to crnc k down on the 
Taliban and otherOMF in the 
country which are starting to 
interpret the withdrawal as a 
forced retreat and claiming 
victory. Interestin~y. the lSAF is 
now promulg,ning that a 
military solution is not possible 
and a political onc is the only 
way forward_ Bul, this of course 
must be an i\f~tan - !ed process'. 
the buuword of Bontl It. Here 
lies th e real handing over of 
·responsibility·. Taking into 
account the on· going insur· 
ge ncies. high profile terrorist 
attacks . the killing of former 
President Bllrhanuddin R.1bb.1ni 
who initiated the negotiations 
with the TaliOOn. stiff resistance 
and cOlltroversies regarding the 
establishment of a Tal iban -
liaison office, all actors involved 
reali7£ that peace and reconcil-
iation is hardly feasible in the 
near fUlUre. As such, onc must 
adm it that it seems as iI thc lSAF 
lost twice: I' irst. thcy were nOI 
able to implement a militnry 
solution; second tltey refuscd to 
take on the official responsibility 
10 carry out a politicnl solution. 
This is gaining mome ntum 
when one assesses the 
performance of {he Taliban over 
the h~t decade. compared to the 
lSAF and ANS!'. Today's '1;lIiOOIl 
afC not only stronger mora!!y 
and psychologically than ever 
before, bUI also mightier in 
political, economic and mili lary 
terms as well. For example. 
Tnlibnn fighters gel paid 30 to 50 
per cent more on avernge better 
thnn members of the Afghnn 
• 
Nationnl Army (ANA) nnd 
Afgh~n Nmionall'olice (AN? ). 
Furthermore, considering the 
insuffi cient equipment of ANA 
and ANP, the existence of local 
power centers with private 
militias. the tremendous tasks 
and security threats to deal \\1th. 
it \\ill be diffiClilt for the central 
(civilian) government to keep 
the security sector loyal and 
ulld e r control. ·[ltere are already 
lIlunerous re ports of members 
of the AN !- defecting to the 
Taliban or o lher OME In this 
context . onc Illust also ask iflhe 
Talibnn nre aClllally willing to 
e nter a peace process. The 
Taliban are quite awnre thnt t he 
centrnl government is losing 
legitimacy. its administration is 
ineffective and corrupt. and in 
military terms not an essential 
challenge to their own armed 
cap<1 b ili tics. COll~XlU Cl I tly frol n 
a Taliban point of view, onc 
could argue that there is no need 
to enter n peace process. 
Howe\'Cr. rhe factthnt no Tnlib.1l1 
represenWtive was present at 
the Imest Ronn confere n ce 
indicmes the long and difficult 
wny !ownrds a political solution 
for future Afghan governments. 
In this co ntext. it wns IlIosl 
unforrunate that the conference 
was overshadowed hy Pakistan's 
boycott 
Islamabad's decision not to 
panicipate is a Ur;unmic setbilck 
for any sort of peace and TL'C0I1 ' 
ci liation process_ First of all. 
I'akistan is becoming increas-
ingly isolated in the region 
because of its arch rivalry with 
India, increasing disharmony 
between Kab\1I and lslnnmbad, 
and. despi le inlp rovements. a 
still ambigllOlls relntionship \vilh 
Iran. Dropping out of such an 
importanl internmionnl 
conference will isolate 
Islamabad e\'en more. Second . 
it c reates suspicions about 
Pakistan's interestS in 
Afghan istan_ In other words, 
Afghnns are becoming incrcas-
in~yconcemetl that lslmnnbad 
might be not interes ted in 
cooperming \\i!h the inte rna -
tional commnni ty since it hns 
its very own 'Strategy devinting 
,I 
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from K.1rt.ai 's vision of l)Cace nnd 
nntional reconcilimion. Third, it 
indic.1tes how wla!ile mId fmgile 
Pn kist an 's civil-Ill i I itary rel,l1 ions 
are. especially the unsteadiness 
of the civilian government_ 
Therefore. one cannot help but 
feel that it seems as though 
l).dkistan·sAf~lanistan policy is 
primarily dom inawd by shor!-
term domesfic de terminants 
instead of a visionary long-term 
foreign policy. Howcver. onc has 
to wldeTStand that thc political 
landscape in Pakistan is 
complcx, and the political room 
to maneuver for the chilinn elite 
ns well as the military top 
echelon has become l'emnrk.1bly 
co ns triCled. Bnsicnlly the 
country needs to re -assess the 
fundamental determinants of 
its foreign po!icy.lltis process 
nceds t ime which nobody has 
or is willing to grunt decision-
makcrs - nei ther the civilians in 
lslamabad nor the generals in 
Rnwnlpindi. Nevertheless . the 
inre rnntional community is 
~ware thal the re will be no 
politiw! sohltion for Afgh~llistan 
\\~thout Pnkistan. 
The regional detenninants for 
Afghanistan's future are 
becoming e\'!'n more complex 
\\1th a view to lran's pL1llS. Being 
also very interested in a stable 
neighborhood, Iran played a 
relatively constructive role 
during Holm 11. Ilut despite the 
fact t hat I ran's Foreign /<.linister 
A!i Akbar Saleh spared the 
conference Vl1th 311 aU too open 
~ltack on the US. he made quile 
clear llHl1 his country willnOI 
accep t the mainre nnnce of 
fore ign bnses and troops in 
Afghanistan afler 2014. In the 
light ohhis us-Iran hostllil)~ the 
worsening o f US- I'akistan 
relations. an Iran- I'akistan 
rapprochement. and Ihe Indo-
I'akistan rival ry. there is no 
doubt Iltat the matrixofintercsts 
of major regional and non -
regional players is quite 
complex. cOlltrddictory and VliU 
remain hannflil to Afghanistan's 
de,'Clopnlent TIlCfl'fure, besides 
promiscs.thcre is no guarantee 
that theAfgllml goveT!Unellt cml 
be assured that lIS neighbol'5 will 
respecl its sovereignty and terri -
torial integrity. In other words, 
there is no assurance that 
attempts from abroad to 
undermine the autonomy of 
Afghan political decision-
making will t)C stopped. 
In retrospect.Ilo1UI II did not 
have much to offer except the 
presentation of remarka ble 
'tnboo topics'. For cxample. the 
term Talibm\' did 1I0t appear in 
official statemenls during the 
conference. 
El'Cn more. the topic of 
Taliban was nOl diseussed at all 
(nlle~st not l)llblicly). wh ich is 
confusing since pence and 
reconcilimion was a rnnjor issue. 
Another nstonishing experience 
was thm il seemed that atl}' critic 
of President Karzai and his 
administration was cut from the 
agenda. TIlls was (Ill wuommate 
phenomenon. since it seems 
that the current Afghan 
govenunelll dL"ieloped a certain 
degree o f resilience and 
resistnnce regarding the imple -
mentation of reforms nnd 
concre te n l1I i -corrupt ion 
measures. 
This not only crea tes 
suspicion bill ~lso rnises the 
legitimate question regarding 
the credibility of the Kar?ai 
commitment's towards 
democracy. In thiscolllext . one 
should also scrutinize Karzai's 
ambitions to change the consti -
tution in order to get reclected 
and stay in power for a third 
term in office as President. In 
this comext. there are nlso plnllS 
of reshapi ng the Afghan central 
govenllnell!. Omngillg tIle illSti· 
tuliollnl d es ign in such an 
(I nst il b le d e rnocra t ic landscape 
is an ambiguolL~ and venturous 
political exercise which might 
transform the constitution into 
a scapegoat fo r particu lar 
interests. lieing neither a donor 
meeting nor a peace conferellCe, 
bUI a coruerence which Hied to 
set up the basic frame for future 
cooperation ,md development 
-onc mus t wonder why the 
internal ional CO llll11Un ity d id 
not shed any light on the 
alanning rmttcrns of democratic 
transfo rmation. 
I.ast bur notlenst. on the isslle 
of the internalional 
cnmmunity's commitment 
towards a long-term 
engngement in the so -called 
period of transformation - the 
decade which follows the 
transition of responsibil ity 
(2014-201 5) - scriouschallengl's 
appear. Ilasically. the lead ing 
NATOI ISAF Slates are totally 
exhausted militarily. financi,1I1y 
and politica lly_ The govern-
ments arc los ing the support 
from their own people, 
especia lly from their respective 
e lectorates. for the on-going 
military mission. Furthermore. 
in the fnceofthe economic and 
fi nnncinl crisis of the US and 
Ell . {heir IloJiticians lack the 
room to maneuver 10 legitirlhlte 
any kind of fil ture engngement 
in Afghanistan. Subsequemly. 
one must be aware that the US 
and EU are not only running 
o ur of arguments but also o f 
fina ncial reSOUICes for any kind 
of long-tcn n engage ment. 
Therefore. the donor 
conference in Tokyo in llily 2012 
wlll be the rea! 'Litmus test' for 
lhe future 1l.1rtnership between 
Knbul and lhe intern~tionnl 
community. To sum up. there 
is n slight perceplion that Ihe 
Wes t is not 'shifting' bur 
'shirking' responsibility. 
Hov.'!'ver. Kal'7~1i is once again 
achieving his centra! goal -
kl't'ping the cash flowing from 
the intemational community! 
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